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Money Laundering Considerations in Blockchain based International 
Commerce 
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There is much to be welcomed concerning the role blockchain technology can play to 
modernise and enhance international trade and create a more level playing field and reduce 
costs. However, it goes without say that the technology also brings with it the prospect of 
abuse leading to trade based money laundering. This chapter explores how the anti money 
laundering (AML) legislation should respond to the use of blockchain technology in shipping 
and trade. Drawing on tried and tested forms of blockchain technology based trade 
transactions, the work examines the fault lines in the current regulatory system and questions 
how best these gaps should be remedied. It also stresses that even states that have banned 
the issue and trade of cryptoassets, such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC), would not 
be immune to the new challenges.   
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It is undeniable that the much vaunted introduction of blockchain and smart contracts in 
shipping and trade is now very much becoming a reality. This chapter explores how the anti 
money laundering (AML) legislation should respond to the use of blockchain technology in 
shipping and trade. Money laundering usually entails three stages – placement, layering and 
integration of the assets in question. The way blockchain technology helps with the placement, 
layering and integration of unlawful funds would be explored against the shipping and 
international trade backdrop.  
 
There are several reasons why shipping based trade1 is a good case template. Broadly 
speaking, shipping based trade is cross border in nature and can involve the movement of 
goods in high volume or value. More importantly, shipping based trade is principally conducted 
on the basis of documents where identity of the participants is not commonly considered to be 
essential. Contract terms such as the INCOTERMS 2020, frequently used in international 
trade, entail the sale and purchase, and distribution of goods simply on the tender of 
documents rather than proof of identity. Compounded to this, where full blockchain technology 
is to be adopted, the movement of goods and payment would be directed by computing 
systems automatically leading to an even higher degree of anonymity.  
 
This chapter therefore highlights the key risks in blockchain based shipping and trade for the 
fight against money laundering. The focus of this work is on the compliance role for banks and 
other stakeholders, arguing that despite the introduction of some important milestones by the 
regulators, there are certain gaps in the existing regulatory system needing attention. It also 
stresses that even in countries which have banned the use and trading of cryptoassets, like 
the People’s Republic of China, blockchain technology based trade money laundering 
continues to pose a problem for regulators. 
 
The backdrop of this work is mainly the international system for combating money laundering. 
Domestic and EU regulatory systems would be mentioned in passing and comparison 
purposes. As regards the methodology, this work presupposes a broad, generic 
understanding of blockchain technology and smart contracts. The author carried out a survey 
of the relevant literature on trade based money laundering to examine how this form of money 
                                               
1 A category of the FATF’s typology of “trade based money laundering” (FATF Study on Trade Based Money 
Laundering  (2006) at https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Trade%20Based%20Money%20Laundering.pdf). All internet-based 





laundering is understood by regulators and to ascertain the scale of the problem.2  
 
This study uses what are largely perceived to be the pioneer stories of successful blockchain 
driven trade as observational targets. The focus as briefly mentioned above is those cases 
which run on conventional trade finance processes and lines, and which have involved 
reputable organisations (for example, Maersk, Barclays, IBM, HSBC, ING, BBVA). Using 
atypical cases would simply not be appropriate in a studying the money laundering 
opportunities in blockchain technology based trade finance given the modus operandi of 
money launderers which is to “fit into” the conventional methods of trading. This work has 
relied on archive-based materials and data published by the trade participants themselves. 
However, in order to avoid bias and puffing, information was drawn also from related 
secondary resources, such as trial project websites, news and media reports and external 
reviews. These case studies are then used to build a general process which blockchain 
technology based trade would follow.  
 
Taking a text based enquiry of the literature on trade based money laundering, this work 
identifies the fault lines in the regulatory regime and offers suggestions for gap filling as 
regards blockchain technology based trade money laundering.  
 
Blockchain technology and international sales3  
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to detail in full the workings of blockchain technology. 
The literature, both in legal and non-legal sources, is voluminous. It suffices for our purposes 
to understand a blockchain technology-based trade in goods system might work and to 
appreciate the reasons as to its increasing acceptance.  
 
A blockchain is a decentralised, distributed record or ledger of transactions or activities. Those 
transactions are stored permanently using cryptographic methods. They are different from 
traditional databases which are administered and organised by a central entity. Blockchains 
on the other hand rely on a peer-to-peer networks that no single person has control; the 
blockchain is managed by computers or servers – called “nodes” – on a peer-to-peer basis 
without the need for the intermediaries who traditionally authenticate transactions (such as 
banks in the case of financial transactions). Transactions are authenticated using 
cryptographical methods, notably a mathematical “consensus protocol”. That protocol is a pre-
fixed system which determines the rules by which the ledger is updated. That means the 
                                               
2 Please see fn. 29 for details of the literature review undertaken. 
3 The discussion in this section is based on Chuah, J., Law of International Trade (6th edn, Sweet & Maxwell) 





participants can trust the authenticity of the record or ledger because no single person has 
control over the technology or system. There is therefore no need for any trusted third party – 
the system itself is trustworthy.  
 
The word “distributed” means that identical copies of the ledger database are downloaded 
from the world wide web and kept on numerous computers spread across a site, an 
organisation, a country, multiple countries or indeed, the world.  
 
A blockchain can be permissioned or permission-less – that is to say there are blockchains 
where access can be granted only to those with permission whilst others are more publicly 
accessible. 
 
Blockchain as a ledger will allow access to a participant at any time thus improving access. 
Further, there is open transparency in that every transaction added to the blockchain will be 
time stamped. There is little risk of tampering because the data is held not in any one place 
but across the entirety of the peer to peer networks (which may include thousands of 
computers or servers). These features of blockchain make it very useful for reliably tracing 
transactions or activities.  
 
Smart contracts,4 which are built on blockchain technology, are computer programmes that 
self-execute when certain conditions are present. Those conditions may or may not be 
premised any pre-existing agreements between the parties.5 With a programmable protocol, 
the smart contract can allow automatically (without human intervention) the execution and 
performance of its terms. This automated execution of terms of the arrangement is ideally 
suited to the global trading environment where distance, costs and lack of trust could lead to 
contract failure. In open account based transactions, the smart contract taken to its natural 
end could enable the automatic release of payment. As to conventional documentary credit 
processes, these are premised on centralised business operations – the smart contract 
system which is built on the distributed blockchain technology reduces the risks centralisation 
brings about, such as, fraud, forgery and malicious alteration.6  
 
                                               
4 Smart contracts should be distinguished from smart legal contracts. Smart legal contracts are legally 
enforceable contracts partially expressed and/or executed in code and thus involve the enforcement of legal 
rights and obligations. A smart contract on the other hand is used to specify software code that is typically stored, 
verified and executed on a blockchain. See UK Jurisdiction Taskforce “Legal Statement on Crytoassets and 
Smart Contracts” (2019) at p. 8 
5 See Chang, S.E.; Chen, Y.C.; Wu, T.C. Exploring blockchain technology in international trade. Ind. Manag. 







How does this new technology change the way international trade is structured?  
 
It might start with the seller or manufacturer setting up or deploying the smart contract 
exclusively for the buyer’s account. The buyer then places an order for the goods in question 
with a quantity equal to X at the seller’s smart contract. The order is sent (for coding or 
programming purposes, we might label this event something like “SendOrder”) which the 
seller’s system would receive the order data and process it. The seller looks for the best 
shipping price on the carrier’s smart contract. It then sends the price (of the shipment and 
goods) to the buyer (this event might be labelled “PriceSent” for coding purposes). 
 
The buyer then performs the secure payment of the price; if this is performed through 
cryptocurrencies (or virtual assets in the terminology preferred by the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF)7), the coins could be paid into the smart contract. The coins would be held there 
until the goods have been delivered. Where this is paid by fiat currency, the buyer’s bank 
performs the payment function by paying into the smart contract. In this case, the bank is a 
permissioned participant to the smart contract. The money is not released until delivery is 
confirmed.   
 
The seller issues the invoice with a delivery date and other relevant information. The buyer 
receives the data (this event might be labelled “InvoiceSent” for coding purposes). The carrier 
would concurrently instruct the goods to be collected and transported. Upon delivery to the 
buyer, the carrier marks the order on the smart contract as delivered. The smart contract 
releases payment to both the seller and carrier, as appropriate.  
 
It should be remembered that all the participants (seller, buyer, carrier etc.) have nodes 
connected to the blockchain.  
 
That is merely one possible means an international sale transaction might be executed by a 
smart contract.  
 
Thus far, we have not factored the element of trade financing – conventionally in shipping 
based international trade is provided for by documentary credits. So how does a blockchain 
based letter of credit work? A simplistic model might assist in our understanding. The process 
might work like this: 
 
                                               





1: The buyer creates a documentary credit application for the issuing bank to review and 
stores it on the blockchain. 
 
2: The issuing bank receives notification to review the letter of credit. It can approve or reject 
it based on the data provided. Once approved, access is then provided to the advising or 
nominated bank automatically for approval. 
 
3: The advising or nominated bank approves or rejects the letter of credit. If approved, the 
seller is able to view the terms of the letter of credit. It is further prompted to examine the 
original application. 
 
4: The seller ships the goods. It prepares the invoice, export paperwork and any other 
documents required under the letter of credit. These are then reduced electronically and 
stored on the blockchain. 
 
5: The nominated bank is notified of the completion of the electronic records on the 
blockchain. It then checks the documents and makes a decision to approve or reject the 
application. 
 
6: The issuing bank will then examine the data and images. It will identify and highlight any 
discrepancies for review by the buyer. If the buyer approves the data, the letter of credit is 
completed and payment is made.  
 
7: On the other hand, where the buyer is dissatisfied with the discrepancy, it can reject 
the tender. 
 
Three conventional blockchain based transactions might be used to demonstrate the extent 
blockchain technology is being used in recent trading relationships.  
 
Case study A: BBVA (Ethereum Blockchain)8 
 
In 2018, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA), a Spanish bank, used blockchain 
technology as a substitute for traditional trade documents. The bank reported that transaction 
time was reduced from 10 days to around three hours. This project consisted of the exportation 
of frozen tuna from Mexico. Payment was by means of a letter of credit issued by BBVA. The 







blockchain solution provider, Wave, would use digitised documentation to replace traditional 
paper-based documents. The digitised documentation would be verified by an agreed 
electronic signature. Electronic presentation is enabled during the transit period. Crucially, the 
digitisation technique could extend to bills of lading in the letter of credit payment processes. 
Moreover, smart contracts were programmed in accordance with contractual agreements that 
specified commercial terms and conditional statements of the letter of credit. Blockchain-
based9 letter of credit and bill of lading systems would allow for financing execution through 
the autonomous features of smart contracts. No manual checking of the documentation is thus 
required. The bank pays upon satisfying itself that the documentation is in order. However, it 
is important to note that payment is not made through the blockchain – money is released in 
the traditional way. Automatic notifications were transmitted to the various participants 
following each relevant stage – for example, upon delivery enabled by the smart contract, the 
shipper would be notified.  
 
Case study 2: HSBC (R3 Corda Blockchain)10 
 
Here, the end-to-end transaction was executed on R3’s Corda blockchain platform. The 
platform, as was intended, was a single shared application. There was no need for multiple 
isolated digital systems across various counterparties who are based at various locations 
across the world. It is an open source blockchain platform; it is different from other blockchain 
platforms in that it uses what is called permissioning technology to control how data is shared 
on the platform but this system allows for the network participants could be increased and 
widened thereby improving scalability. It is also able to give access control to “dominant 
parties”11 which means there can be a central party managing the flow. The letter of credit was 
issued by ING Bank for Tricon Energy USA (the buyer) with HSBC India as the advising and 
negotiating bank for Reliance Industries, India (the seller). However it is important to note that 
transfer of funds did not happen over the blockchain, only title in the goods had transferred 
over the blockchain “transfer” of the bill of lading.  
 
Case study 3: Maersk (Hyperledger Fabric)12 
 
In December 2016, Maersk initiated a tracking project with IBM for flower shipments from 
                                               
9 “Blockchain based” means that the letter of credit is embedded in the blockchain but funds are not transferred 
using the blockchain.  
10 https: //gendal.me/2016/04/05/introducing-r3-corda-a-distributed-ledger-designed-for-financial-services/   
11 Usually the banks 
12 Reported at https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomgroenfeldt/2017/03/05/ibm-and-maersk-apply-blockchain-to-





Kenya to the Netherlands. Participating parties in the blockchain using Hyperledger Fabric 
included the traders, shippers, freight forwarders and customs authorities. The rationale was 
to improve how the logistical chain could be better monitored and how the shipment traceability 
could be improved. The shipping company, Maersk, and the IT services provider, IBM, worked 
jointly to digitise and dematerialise the traditional documentation. The controlling party in the 
blockchain is Maersk. The blockchain allowed all participants to track and trace the movement 
of the goods thereby reducing the physical processes and the need for constant 
communications between the parties. The information about the shipment was held in the 
blockchain for all the participants to consult, including approvals and clearances given by 
customs. Cryptography was used to prevent counterfeiting of the records. In this particular 
example, Maersk had also provided the necessary trade financing for the sale and purchase13 
– this means that the shipping company, not a bank, had taken on the role of making payment 
on behalf of the buyer. In other words, if the Maersk trade finance is not being used, any letter 
of credit might be outside the blockchain. More recently, Maersk and IBM have developed 
their own blockchain platform called TradeLens which works on similar lines.14  
 
It is vital to note that as these case studies demonstrate, in most conventional blockchain 
based trade the payment by letter of credit is not made through the blockchain although the 
terms of the letter of credit are embedded in the blockchain. That means payment in these 
conventional cases remains to be made using traditional way and in fiat currency. The next 
ambitious step is to enable payment to be made automatically and using cryptocurrencies, 
thereby potentially by-passing the banks.  
 
We shall return to these case studies following a discussion of the money laundering context. 
 
 
The Money Laundering Context 
 
Trade Based Money Laundering has been recognised by the Financial Action Task Force 
                                               
13 The facility would be transacted through Maersk Trade Finance A/S incorporated in Copenhagen, Denmark, 
part of the Maersk Group. Its website describes its workings in this way – (a) Goods shipped through Maersk will 
be taken as collateral. It will be LIBOR linked. (b) Pricing is transparent, there are no hidden costs. (c) Shipment 
must be done through Maersk (although it is possible to use the trader’s own current forwarder/Customs House 
Agents for logistics management). (d) Need assignment of receivables by the exporter. (e) A credit facility will be 
sanctioned for a designated period. (https://fs.maerskline.com/faq). It is important to note that the finance 
produce can be offered to both buyers and sellers. For sellers, the financing is offered as pre-shipment 
financing and the seller might still require the buyer to pay by letter of credit. The proceeds from the letter of 






(FATF)15 in its landmark study published in 2006, as one of the three main methods by which 
criminal organisations and terrorist financiers move money for the purpose of disguising its 
origins and integrating it back into the formal economy.16 The FATF Study 2006 highlighted 
the increasing attractiveness of trade-based money laundering (TBML) as a method for 
laundering funds, compared with misuse of the financial system (both formal and alternate) 
and through physical movement of cash (cash smuggling).17 The revision of FATF standards 
undertaken in 2003 entailed stricter controls on the financial system and on cash couriers, 
which may have had an unintended consequence of leaving the trade finance sector more 
vulnerable to ML and TF.18 There is no doubt that the increased volumes, speed and value in 
globally traded goods and services coupled with the often opaque and complex trading 
arrangements have led to an increasing abuse of trade financing as a means to commit money 
laundering. The casting of blockchain technology into the mix creates additional problems for 
regulators.  
 
The FATF also took pains, when the report was released, to state that trade based money 
laundering has long been under the radar and had not benefited from the same level of 
analysis and study other forms of money laundering schemes had attracted.19 In 2011, the 
Australian Institute of Criminology published a research paper20 asserting the same 
sentiments. Since then, there have been more work done on trade based money laundering 
but there remain various controversies and debates around definitions and means of 
combating it.21 
 
How should trade based money laundering be defined? 
 
A useful starting point for a general definition of money laundering might be the Vienna 
                                               
15 The FATF describes itself in these terms “The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is the global money 
laundering and terrorist financing watchdog. The inter-governmental body sets international standards that aim to 
prevent these illegal activities and the harm they cause to society. As a policy-making body, the FATF works to 
generate the necessary political will to bring about national legislative and regulatory reforms in these areas. With 
more than 200 countries and jurisdictions committed to implementing them.  The FATF has developed the FATF 
Recommendations, or FATF Standards, which ensure a co-ordinated global response to prevent organised 
crime, corruption and terrorism.” (https://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/)  
16 FATF 2006: 25 
17 ibid 
18 Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering, Typology report on Trade Based Money Laundering (2012) at para 
27 
19 The FATF said: “[trade based money laundering] has received considerably less attention in academic circles 
than other means of transferring value” (FATF (2006):3) 
20 Sullivan, C. & Smith, E., Paper 115: Trade-based money laundering: Risks and regulatory responses (2011) at 
pp. 4-5; see also the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (FATF) Typology Report on Trade Based Money 
Laundering (2012) p. 39 at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Trade_Based_ML_APGReport.pdf  
21 See for example FATF, Best Practices on Trade Based Money Laundering (2012); US GAO, Report to 





Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988. Article 
3(1)(b) of the Convention is a good starting point at providing the essence of the money 
laundering offence which contracting states should adopt in their domestic legal systems. That 
article provides: 
 
(i) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived from 
any offence or offences established in accordance with subparagraph a) of this 
paragraph22, or from an act of participation in such offence or offences, for the 
purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting 
any person who is involved in the commission of such an offence or offences to 
evade the legal consequences of his actions;  
(ii) The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, 
movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such 
property is derived from an offence or offences established in accordance with 
subparagraph a) of this paragraph23 or from an act of participation in such an 
offence or offences. 
 
A similar concept of money laundering was extended to cover assets and proceeds derived 
from organised crime by the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 2000, the so-
called Palermo Convention24. The subsequent Convention against Corruption 2004 extended 
the fight against money laundering to proceeds from bribery and corruption. 
At a generic level, from the definition it follows that money laundering involves three phases – 
placement, layering and integration of the assets in question. Placement involves the transfer 
of the illicit assets into the legitimate financial system. Layering is that part of the process 
which sets out to hide or disguise the true source of the asset. Once the asset has been 
“laundered”, it is removed from the legitimate repository and be used by the criminal 
beneficiary.  
There are three primary methods of money laundering: the laundering of money through the 
financial system, the physical movement of money (such as through cash couriers), and trade 
based money laundering.25 FATF has defined trade based money laundering as “the process 
of disguising the proceeds of crime and moving value through the use of trade transactions in 
                                               
22 That subparagraph (a) generally provides for production, manufacture, sale, distribution, transport, import etc 
of illicit narcotic drugs. 
23 See above fn. 9 
24 See art 6 





an attempt to legitimise their illicit origins.26 On the other hand, in its Best Practices Paper on 
trade based money laundering, “trade based money laundering” is defined more broadly as: 
“the process of disguising the proceeds of crime and moving value through the use of trade 
transactions in an attempt to legitimise their illicit origins or finance their activities.”27 That said, 
it is submitted that the words “finance their activities” do not add much to the working definition. 
The important consideration in this form of money laundering is the use of trade transactions 
to place, layer and integrate the “dirty assets”. 
The FATF considers trade primarily to be international trade – domestic trade does not appear 
to be included in its working definitions.28 Again, it is not clear if this absence (if indeed it is 
excluded) would leave a significant gap in the law. Most AML systems are domestically 
oriented and FATF recommendations are merely for guidance. It is difficult to envisage a 
situation where domestic AML would exclude home based trade money laundering from the 
definition of the money laundering offence. 
How extensive is trade based money laundering? 
It is difficult to estimate the scale of the problem of trade based money laundering. The 
clandestine nature of the crime makes it gruelling to ascertain or scope the magnitude of the 
problem. This work has drawn on an extensive literature review29 to give the reader a sense 
of the scale of the problem. The net conclusion is that these works all have various limitations 
as regards the method used in delineating the scale of the problem but there is enough 
evidence, even if not properly empirical, showing trade based money laundering to be 
significantly substantial a problem. It is noteworthy to quote the following from the US 
Government Accountability Office: 
                                               
26 Ibid, at 3 
27 FATF (2008a: 1) 
28 In its Best Practices Paper, FATF (2008a: 2) defined a ‘trader’ as “anyone who facilitates the exchange of 
goods and related services across national borders, international boundaries or territories. This would also 
include a corporation or other business unit organized and operated principally for the purpose of importing or 
exporting goods and services (eg import/export companies)”. It follows thus that participants in a domestic trade 
transaction appear not to be included.  
29 The literature surveyed includes: Zdanowicz, J., “Trade-Based Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing,” 
Review of Law and Economics, vol. 5, no. 2 (2009): 855; McSkimming, S., “Trade-Based Money Laundering: 
Responding to an Emerging Threat,” Deakin Law Review, vol. 15, no. 1 (2010): 37; Forstater, M., Illicit Financial 
Flows, Trade Misinvoicing, and Multinational Tax Avoidance: The Same or Different? (Center for Global 
Development, Policy Paper 123, 2018); Global Financial Integrity, Illicit Financial Flows to and from 148 
Developing Countries: 2006–2015 (2019); Walker, J. and Unger, B., “Measuring Global Money Laundering: ‘The 
Walker Gravity Model,’” Review of Law and Economics, vol. 5, no. 2 (2009): 821; Soudijn, M. (2014), "A critical 
approach to trade-based money laundering", Journal of Money Laundering Control, Vol. 17 No. 2, 230. As to 
policy and research papers published by international bodies, a survey was carried out in respect of the FATF 
documents (the Trade Based Money Laundering Report (2006) and Best Practices Paper on Trade Based 
Money Laundering (2008)); the UNODC Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting from Drug Trafficking and 
Other Transnational Organized Crimes (2011); and WCO Illicit Financial Flows via Trade Mis-invoicing (2018). 






“Some U.S. officials and knowledgeable sources believe that, based upon available 
evidence, TBML is likely one of the largest forms of money laundering. In addition, as 
countries have strengthened their controls to combat other forms of money laundering, 
various U.S. government reports and officials, as well as knowledgeable sources have 
stated that there are indications that criminal organizations and terrorist organizations 
have increased their use of TBML to launder their funds. For example, FinCEN30 has 
reported that since the Mexican government increased restrictions on U.S. dollar cash 
deposits at Mexican financial institutions in 2010, Mexican drug cartels appear to have 
increasingly turned to TBML as an alternative means of repatriating profits from U.S. 
drug sales. Similarly, in Australia, as controls on large cash deposits at ATMs have 
increased since 2017, criminals have increased their use of TBML to hide their profits, 
according U.S. officials at Embassy Canberra. In addition, the 2020 National Strategy 
for Combating Terrorist and Other Illicit Financing notes that there has been a steady 
decrease in seizures related to bulk cash smuggling from 2012 through 2018 and 
states that this decrease could indicate that criminal organizations are increasingly 
turning to other means to move illicit money, including TBML.”31 (emphasis added) 
 
The continued growth in blockchain technology in international trade is likely to have an 
exacerbating effect. 
 
Blockchain technology trade based money laundering  
 
Our case studies, as has been stressed, represent by and large the current, conventional 
forms of blockchain technology based trading arrangements. Lessons from how they work will 
be useful in our evaluation of the money laundering perspective.  
 
From the case studies discussed above, there are several features of blockchain technology 
based trade which could be envisaged as giving cause for concern. It certainly goes without 
saying that these risk aspects too are what make blockchain technology based trade attractive 
to business. The position taken in this chapter is that regulation must balance risk of money 
laundering against the benefits of blockchain.  
 
Those features are: 
(a) Paperless  
                                               
30 The US Financial Crimes Enforcement Network  





(b) Ease of establishing the contractual networks 
(c) No central party in the blockchain consortium 
(d) Removal of intermediaries; human agency replaced 
(e) Possible use of cryptocurrency or virtual assets – diffused loci of assets 
 
Looking at the case studies, one commonality is clearly the dematerialisation of paper 
documentation. There is potential for documentation, including supportive, secondary 
documents such as packing lists, survey reports, inspection reports etc., also to be embedded 
into the blockchain. A blockchain system which does not adequately allow for cross checking 
of the information could be abused by money launderers to create trade description fraud. A 
blockchain based system could go beyond a simply digitisation of the documents for the 
purposes of international trade – blockchain based technology on which smart contracting is 
based could effectively automate the document checking process. The effectiveness of the 
system to prevent anomalies and other “red flags”32 to be picked up leaves is questionable.  
 
Trade description fraud is one of the more common forms of trade based money laundering. 
It can include: 
(a) Over- and under-invoicing of goods and services As FATF explains, “[t]he key element 
of this technique is the misrepresentation of the price of the goods or service in order 
to transfer additional value between the importer and exporter”33. 
(b) Multiple invoicing of goods and services where the same goods (also called carousel 
transactions) are invoiced repeatedly often using multiple financial institutions to pay. 
In a highly publicised fraud in the port of Qingdao, PRC, companies controlled by a 
China-born, Singaporean businessman were alleged to have used invoices for the 
same metals stockpiles several times to milk the banks out of large sums of money.34  
(c) Under shipment of goods; documents are created to indicate a misrepresent the true 
(and smaller) amount of goods shipped, and there are no genuine buyers at the point 
of discharge. 
(d) False description of goods: misrepresenting the goods to be of a higher quality or value 
than they really are.  
 
                                               
32 See FATF Best Practices (2006); these red flags might relate, for example, to where the goods are said to be 
coming from or entering, the presence of any free ports, type of goods, corporate structures of consignors and 
consignees, trade patterns, etc. 
33 (2006: 4) 
34 This case has led to multiple legal claims involving competing ownership rights. It is made worse by the fact 
that there is lack of legal clarity as to where the assets are located for the purposes of redress and seizure. The 
port of Qingdao was also sued for failing to spot the fraud thereby causing substantial losses to the banks.  
CNBC reports that the losses suffered by banks and trading houses were in the region of USD 900 million 





These trade based money laundering activities could also be helped by the fact that blockchain 
technology based trade could be exploited for the setting up of false or fictitious entities. In 
order to prevent false entities from being established, the blockchain based system will need 
to create systems to replicate physical checks on identity. Due diligence must be exercised, 
not only in respect of the exporter – it is tempting take a more lackadaisical approach with the 
importer, erroneously assuming that the money laundering risk lies primarily with the “seller”. 
Blockchain technology can facilitate the creation of a distributed marketplace where there are 
not only multiple buyers but also where buyers can become sellers and vice versa in chains 
of contracts. A large scale distributed marketplace could make it more challenging to apply 
customer due diligence (CDD) and “know your customer” (KYC) principles.35 It is more difficult 
properly to evaluate the risk when there are many small scale purchasers and sellers, as 
against a large transaction. 
 
The challenge of identifying the user or participant and carrying out due diligence is further 
exacerbated by the fact that in a blockchain based system there is usually no central controller 
– the platform provider, unlike in conventional digitised trade involving electronic bills of lading 
and electronic letters of credit, is not in theory involved in monitoring the execution of the smart 
contracts. The smart contracts are intended to be self-executing. That said, as we have seen 
in the HSBC (R3 Corda Blockchain) case study above, there is a controller (usually the bank 
which is under a duty, generally speaking, to carry out checks for anti-money laundering 
purposes), thereby actually modifying the pure form of blockchain technology. Where there is 
no controlling party would also mean, anti money laundering legislation could well be 
frustrated. Moreover, where the blockchain users all have access to the same information held 
in the blockchain, data protection laws might make it even harder for any interested participant 
(if any) to discern any identity anomalies.   
 
A much lauded benefit of blockchain technology based trade is the fact that intermediaries 
could be dispensed with. Although it is undeniable that intermediaries are often the cause of 
delays and additional costs, they also play an important role in helping verify the different 
supply chain nodes and participants. In anti money laundering legislation where knowing the 
customer is a key plank of the law, this added layer could assist in the customer identification 
and verification process. Moreover, these third parties are often involved in verifying the goods 
and their description. For example, an inspector could well notice that a container does not 
                                               
35 See generally CDD and KYC principles described by the FATF (see section D,FATF Recommendations 
(Updated  2019) at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.pdf); note that CDD 





appear to be as heavy as the declared weight might suggest.36 In a blockchain world, unless 
the contract calls for the intervention of a third party inspector and/or the computing system is 
programmed to detect anomalies like that, such trade based money laundering activities could 
go undetected.  
 
We have seen in our case studies that none has gone to the extent of enabling actual payment 
using cryptocurrencies through the blockchain. However, it would be ill-advised to assume 
that crypto-payment would not be used to pay for international sale contracts. Indeed, despite 
serious set-backs, it could not have gone unnoticed that Venezuela had attempted to require 
its oil buyers to use its virtual currency, Petro, as a result of the lack of tradability in its fiat 
currency due to economic sanctions.37  
 
Once cryptocurrencies come into the picture, the scene does get rather murkier. The argument 
that cryptocurrencies could be conveniently used for money laundering purposes is well 
rehearsed. In this work, the focus is on how crypto-payment facilitated by the blockchain based 
trade might be used for money laundering. For ease of reading, we shall use the term 
cryptoasset or cryptocurrency instead of the FATF preferred terminology, virtual asset. 
 
Cryptocurrency and trade based money laundering 
 
The use of cryptocurrency in trade based money laundering is not unknown. The US Drug 
Enforcement Agency has reported that trade based money laundering involving 
cryptocurrency has been observed in schemes whereby goods from the Peoples Republic of 
China (PRC) are being shipped to Mexico and South America.38 Whereas in the past, “wire or 
bulk cash smuggling” would be used for payment, that has been replaced in a number of cases 
by payment in bitcoin. Payment by bitcoin, it is reported, is preferred by certain PRC 
manufacturers as it allows them to avoid the PRC capital controls. Moreover, and of interest 
to us, is the fact that the purchase of bitcoin from a licenced money service business (MSB) 
faces less scrutiny, compared to a wire transfer from the US to the PRC. It is also not unusual 
that the bitcoin would also be purchased from unregulated brokers in jurisdictions outside the 
US who would intertwine its use for trade based money laundering with capital flight devices. 
Cryptocurrency works best in money laundering where it could be converted back to fiat 
                                               
36 For example, as part of a trade based money laundering scheme to over-declare the quantity of the goods. 
See above.  
37 See https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-16/venezuela-s-crypto-mandate-spurs-some-to-pause-
oil-purchases; Bloomberg also reports, “Most companies taking Venezuelan crude no longer pay cash. Instead, 
they engage in swap transactions, where they take crude oil in exchange for gasoline or diesel. Others, like Eni 
SpA and Repsol SA, get oil in payment for old debts.” 





currency easily.39  
 
Another cryptoasset needing consideration is “stablecoins”, so-called. Although there is no 
universal definition of “stablecoins”, it might be useful to borrow that applied by the Financial 
Stability Board. It describes stabelcoins as a type of crypto “ that aims to maintain a stable 
value relative to a specified asset, or a pool or basket of assets to other assets”.40 As regards 
trade based money laundering, the type of stablecoins most at risk of abuse are those which 
could be scaled up quickly for mass adoption. That said, even where stablecoins are used in 
a small scale setting, the fact that they can be used under the cloak of anonymity and may be 
easily exchanged or converted to another cryptoasset make them vulnerable to money 
laundering activity.41  
 
In certain jurisdictions such as the PRC, the issuing and trading of cryptoassets, other than 
the state backed digital yuan, are banned. The digital yuan too is not based on blockchain 
technology. However, three points should perhaps be mentioned. First, the banning of 
cryptoassets and removing blockchain from the state backed digital currency does not mean 
an exclusion of blockchain technology from international trading. Indeed, the PRC has taken 
a lead in introducing its own national blockchain based service network – akin to a grand scale 
platform backed by the state. The platform is intended to enable all blockchain technology 
apps to operate across any cloud, portal or framework.42 Secondly, this state backed service 
is intended to be accessible to as wide as user base as possible, with various access points.43 
The Blockchain Based Service Network development team also stated, “in principle, the BSN 
is a multi-chain, multi-ledger blockchain system.”44 The availability of such open access, 
despite the fact that permission might be required, does not remove the risks for money 
laundering and the challenges for financial institutions and other stakeholders (the so-called 
                                               
39 That explains why it is less commonly used by terrorist groups which are more geographically restricted such 
as Boko Haram. Groups, like Hamas, Hezbollah, and al Qaeda, whose presence is found in numerous 
geographic locations across the world with several points of transfer between the initial source of funds and the 
ultimate beneficiary, would find the use of cryptocurrencies more viable (see Report by Goldman, Maruyama, 
Rosenberg, Saravalle, & Solomon-Strauss, “Terrorist Use of Virtual Currencies: Containing the Potential Threat” 
(2017), p. 27 at https://www.lawandsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/CLSCNASReportTerroristFinancing-
Final.pdf)  
40 FSB, Addressing the regulatory, supervisory and oversight challenges raised by “global stablecoin” 
arrangements: Consultative document, April 2020; The FATF explains in its Report to the G20 on Stablecoins 
(June 2020) at https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/Virtual-Assets-FATF-Report-
G20-So-Called-Stablecoins.pdf : “the value of a so-called stablecoin may be pegged, for instance, to the value of 
a fiat currency or a basket of assets that may include fiat currencies, digital currencies, investment securities, 
commodities and/or real estate. A so-called stablecoin may also employ algorithmic means to stabilise its market 
value.” (para 23). 
41 This latter feature is called “chain hopping” and could allow for multiple layering of illicit funds within a short 
timeframe, thereby allowing a more sophisticated disguise of the origins of funds. (ibid, at para 35) 
42 See the service’s website at https://bsnbase.io/g/main/index  
43 The PRC’s BSN Development Association, Blockchain Based Service Network: Introductory White Paper 
(September 2019), at chs. IV and V. 





AML Reporting Entities), required under PRC law,45 to undertake the necessary checks. 
Indeed, many of the guidance papers on customer due diligence issued by the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission and the People’s Bank of China currently do not refer to blockchain 
technology based trade as a money laundering typology.46 Thirdly, where the digital yuan is 
to be used in place of more conventional cryptoassets, in theory, that has some value in the 
anti money laundering efforts. The trials concluded in October 2020 and it has been reported 
that its use in the sale and purchase of goods has been successful.47 As regards money 
laundering, the advantage with the digital yuan is that as it is not blockchain based and is more 
like electronic cash, the banks issuing it will have a record of what has been exchanged for 
the digital yuan. That record will allow the banks to help monitor the flow of the digital yuan in 
the economy, which in turn could held the law enforcement agents track illicit flows of funds, 
including money laundering or terrorist financing. In practice, the issue is that once the digital 
currency or the fiat currency used to exchange for the digital currency is internationalised 
(which is part of the PRC’s plan to reduce reliance on the US dollar) that tracking and tracing 
would not be an easy exercise for the issuing banks. In sum, more work needs to be had to 
develop better practical measures for all reporting entities. 
 
The impact and reach of anti money laundering controls 
 
In the UK, EU and elsewhere the anti money laundering regimes have evolved to provide for 
controls over those individuals involved in the movement of cryptoassets, whether blockchain 
technology based trade is used or not. On the other hand, by default, any transaction using 
blockchain technology but does not involve the use of cryptoassets would not be subject to 
special rules. Instead the general rules would apply. In short, that means the case studies in 
this study would all fall to be dealt with using traditional KYC and CDD. In the light of the 
discussion of the risks above, even if the traditional risk based approach is adopted for CDD 
and KYC processes special protocols may need to be established to ensure good practice 
amongst financial institutions involved in the sanctioning of funds transfers and payments. 
There is rise in the number of commercial enterprises providing, for a fee, programmes to 
assist in the KYC and CDD processes. Whilst that is not objectionable and, indeed, can be of 
tremendous assistance to smaller financial institutions and firms tasked to undertake anti 
                                               
45 Law of the People's Republic of China on Anti-money Laundering (2006) No. 56 (Adopted at the 24th session 
of the Standing Committee of the 10th National People's Congress); and  
46 A survey of the 2019 IMF Staff Country Report for the PRC: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money 
Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (No. 19/172; 2019), and IMF Staff Country Report for the 
PRC: Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes-FATF Recommendations for Anti-Money Laundering 
and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (Country Report No. 19/173; 2019) 






money laundering checks, firms must be careful not to place the entirety of their responsibility 
on those for-profit service providers. 
 
KYC and CDD are protocols to be undertaken by the regulated financial institution or firm. 
However, blockchain technology based trade, as we see in our case studies, could well 
dispense with the need for a controlling or central entity. Without this key entity, the anti money 
laundering regime will need to focus, in the main, on the entrance or exit points – namely 
where the money laundering proceeds are placed into or taken out of the system to be spent. 
As to whether anti money laundering legislation applies to blockchain platform providers, the 
issue depends very much on whether they could be deemed to be providing services in like 
manner as financial institutions, lawyers, accountants, foreign exchange dealers, art dealers, 
auction platforms etc48 or whether they are also cryptoasset exchange platforms.49 If the latter, 
they could be directly bound by the due diligence and reporting duties of anti money laundering 
regulations. 
 
The pressure is more palpable in the case of cryptoasset or cryptocurrency. Here too there is 
often no central body responsible for controlling the movement of the funds. As a result, the 
FATF’s recommendation is for national authorities critically to ensure that originators and 
beneficiaries of financial transactions are identifiable and are not anonymous. Cryptoasset 
providers50 and financial institutions must comply with the “travel rule”.51 The travel rule is a 
non-legally52 binding recommendation53 exhorting countries to ensure that originating 
cryptoasset providers obtain and hold required and accurate originator information and 
required beneficiary information on cryptoasset transfers, submit that information to the 
beneficiary cryptoasset provider or financial institution (if any) immediately and securely, and 
make it available on request to appropriate authorities. Countries should ensure that 
beneficiary cryptoasset providers obtain and hold required originator information and required 
and accurate beneficiary information on cryptoasset transfers and make it available on request 
to appropriate authorities. Other requirements which were applied to traditional funds transfers 
(such as monitoring of the availability of information, and taking freezing action and prohibiting 
transactions with designated persons and entities) would apply on the same basis to 
                                               
48 See for example regs 10-15 of the UK Money Laundering Regulations 2017 as amended by the Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) Regulations 2019 
49 See the EU 5th Anti Money Laundering Directive generally; also Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 
(Amendment) Regulations 2019 reg. 
50 Called “virtual asset service providers” by the FATF 
51 The travel rule is not a new tool; indeed, it has been applied in the US in 1990s in relation to wire transfers 
(Title 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations 1995, Section 103.33(g)). See too Annex A to the FATF, 12-Month 
Review of the Revised FATF Standards on Virtual Assets/VASPs (June 2020). 
52 Emphasis added. 





cryptoassets.54 The same obligations apply to financial institutions when sending or receiving 
virtual asset transfers on behalf of a customer. 
 
The FATF Recommendations also require states to take effective and proportionate 
enforcement measures against firms and financial institutions that fail to enforce anti money 
laundering standards.55 However, the money service businesses providing cryptoasset 
services tend to decentralised and could be established in multiple geographical locations. 
Many cryptocurrency exchanges also do not have the infrastructure to obtain, hold and 
transmit identifying information of the participants in a transaction.56 There is no denying that 
at present there is no universal consensus as to the technology on which information and data 
sharing would be managed, resourced and regulated. A compounding fact making compliance 
with the travel rule exceedingly difficult is the existence (and anecdotally, prevalence) of crypto 
mixers which mask and hide the actual source of the cryptoassets. The net result is thus that 
there will be many cryptoasset providers which will be outside the reach of the law and also 
many providers intending to apply the travel rule but are actually unable to do so properly.  
 
The FATF Recommendations also expressly provide for sanctions and enforcement measures 
to be taken against the perpetrators of money laundering.57 These measures include criminal 
prosecutions and, importantly, asset confiscation. The 2019 FATF Recommendations state 
that countries must adopt measures which include the power: 
“… to: (a) identify, trace and evaluate property that is subject to confiscation; (b) carry 
out provisional measures, such as freezing and seizing, to prevent any dealing, 
transfer or disposal of such property; (c) take steps that will prevent or void actions that 
prejudice the country’s ability to freeze or seize or recover property that is subject to 
confiscation; and (d) take any appropriate investigative measures”58 
It is immediately obvious that where the asset in question had been dematerialised into a 
cryptoasset or if it had been mixed, these sanctions and seizures would be hugely problematic. 
That is, even before factoring in the question as to where the asset is located. Where no 
cryptoasset is involved, such as in a “conventional” blockchain technology based trade, the 
key to enforcement lies very much in international cooperation.59 However, many developing 
countries (also being exporting countries) do not have a sufficiently developed international 
law enforcement cooperation infrastructure.  
                                               
54 ibid 
55 See Section D (FATF Recommendations 2019) 
56 Where the participants are in trade related blockchain, it should be recalled that the information would be 
generally available. 
57 Section B (FATF Recommendations 2019) 
58 R.4 ibid 








The current anti money laundering risk based approach advocated by the FATF recognises 
the magnitude of the problem but considers that as there are many socio-economic 
impediments to scaling up in the mass adoption of cryptoassets, the measures being taken 
are reasonably acceptable.  
 
It is argued that although a reality premised approach is appropriate, it must be appreciated 
that given the scale of trade based money laundering, the use of blockchain and cryptoassets 
in international trade could well make matters worse. That is not to say that blockchain should 
not be a present and important feature in international trade. Indeed, the technology itself 
could be exploited to provide helpful anti money laundering solutions; blockchain technology 
can assuredly assist in the satisfying the requirements of the travel rule, KYC and CDD. So 
too are market forces and structures – if there is no easy way to extract the laundered assets, 
for example, the money launderer would try something else. However, as regards the policy 
and law, it is important to keep watch on how trade based money laundering activities are 
continually shifting and changing. The anti money laundering rules and standards should thus 
continue to be reviewed in the light of those changes. This chapter serves, in some modest 
way, to identify how trade based money laundering might evolve in the light of blockchain 
technology and smart contracting and demonstrate what anti money laundering law should be 
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